continued . . .
Early in the War of Independence the Croatian Army was a weak and dispersed band of militias. As an immature state, facing the organized military pressures of the Yugoslav Army, the army Croatia had was vulnerable to what can be described as local political control that was outside of any centrally directed military chain of command. These political problems were in evidence in the Croatian Army, although to a, generally, ever diminishing extent, throughout the war. They were felt strongest in areas that were not HDZ controlled, such as Split. Early in the war, military co-operation between units, including regarding the supply of ammunition, weapons and reinforcements, had to be, intolerably, negotiated. This improvised system had to be replaced by units responding to the orders of a higher command. By the HDZ seizing fuller control of the state and the public purse, both at the local and national level, this facilitated the building of a responsive army and defence ministry whose efforts were supported by all the organs of national and local government. This included the interior, health and foreign ministries. Although this kind of central party control did lead to financial and other abuses.
The need for party political control of the army is seen as a liability by western military theorists generally. War is ‘politics by other means’. Decisions by nation states on whether to start and stop wars or to form alliances are made by political leaders. However, western experience has demonstrated that the planning and running of both strategic and tactical military operations, should be exclusively contained within the military. Western military thinking considers ‘political meddling’ quite broadly. Not only does it include the party-political, it encompasses the wider self-interests and actions of individuals and groups, who are not strictly politically allied, that may interfere with military activities. These interests may be local, regional or national and they may be based on the desire to profit from the distribution of resources required by the military. Under this banner, actions that might be considered to be purely criminal, in the civil sphere, are considered ‘political’ if they affect the chain of command, military supply, recruitment, or indeed operations. If they are not espionage or subversion activities of course.
Concerning the national defence, whether Croatia now has a military and bureaucratic culture and working procedures that are free from political meddling is open to question.
It is possible that these themes will be returned to in later posts, particularly if there is a demand for such material.